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Abstract
Background: Using non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) as a case, we used Taiwan’s National Health
Insurance (NHI) database, to empirically explore the association between policy interventions (price regulation, new
drug entry, and an information shock) and drug expenditures, utilization, and market structure between 2001 and
2004.
Methods: All NSAIDs prescribed in ambulatory visits in the NHI system during our study period were included and
aggregated quarterly. Segmented regression analysis for interrupted time series was used to examine the
associations between two price regulations, two new drug entries (cyclooxygennase-2 inhibitors) and the rofecoxib
safety signal and expenditures and utilization of all NSAIDs. Herfindahl index (HHI) was applied to further examine
the association between these interventions and market structure of NSAIDs.
Results: New entry was the only variable that was significantly correlated with changes of expenditures (positive
change, p = 0.02) and market structure of the NSAIDs market in the NHI system. The correlation between price
regulation (first price regulation, p = 0.62; second price regulation, p = 0.26) and information shock (p = 0.31) and
drug expenditure were not statistically significant. There was no significant change in the prescribing volume of
NSAIDs per rheumatoid arthritis (RA) or osteoarthritis (OA) ambulatory visit during the observational period. The
market share of NSAIDs had also been largely substituted by these new drugs up to 50%, in a three-year period
and resulted in a more concentrated market structure (HHI 0.17).
Conclusions: Our empirical study found that new drug entry was the main driving force behind escalating drug
spending, especially by altering the market share.
Background
Over the past decades, the worldwide pharmaceutical
market has become characterized by persistent increase
in expenditures [1]. This has attracted the attention of
policymakers and provoked questions about trends and
factors in the unending escalation of pharmaceutical
spending [2,3]. The three main components typically
identified as affecting pharmaceutical spending are the
effects of price, volume and therapeutic choice [2,4,5].
Health policymakers believe that these components are,
in turn, primarily affected by policy interventions such
as drug price regulation or reimbursement of new tech-
nology [3]. Despite the large assumed importance of
these policy interventions, very little objective data is
actually available about the extent to which these inter-
ventions influence the drug market.
Drug price regulation policies have been investigated
in previous studies, although the association between
price regulation and drug spending is questioned [6,7].
Although theory has suggested that drug market shift
due to price regulation could be a significant confoun-
der in assessing the controversial effects of price regula-
tion on cost containment [8], no product-level data has
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from product substitution post-price regulation.
Similarly, existing evidence regarding new technologies
usually focuses on their potential economic burden but
ignores their market impact. New technology entries are
never a single market event. Instead, new technologies
diffuse into the market. As a result, it is important to
establish a longitudinal evaluation of the diffusion of
new drugs into a medical care system. This allows policy
makers to monitor patients’ access to new drugs and
contain unnecessary expenditures. However, unlike
innovation within other markets [9-12], studies on the
diffusion patterns of new drug are relatively limited. In
addition, post-marketing information of new drugs [13]
may have influence on drug market but have limited
empirical data as well. Since the specific policies that
would be implemented to curb rising costs would differ
based on the source of expenditure increase, it is impor-
tant to examine whether expenditure changes are attri-
butable to price regulation, new entry, or post-
marketing information.
The purpose of this study, therefore, was to use Tai-
wan’s National Health Insurance (NHI) database, to
empirically explore the association between policy inter-
ventions (price regulation, new entry, and information
shock) and drug expenditure, utilization, and market
structure across time frame. For the purpose of this
study, the particular pharmaceutical market we chose
was that of the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
(NSAIDs) and cyclooxygennse-2 (COX-2) inhibitors,
and the time frame was a 4-year time period, 2001-2004.
Methods
Data source
Our data were drawn from the 2001-2004 NHI data-
bases, a nationally, population-based claims database.
There’re several advantages of using Taiwan’s NHI data-
base [14] to quantify the changes of drug expenditure,
utilization and market structure after policy interven-
tions. First, this mandatory health insurance program,
with approximately 23 millions insured, covers nearly
over 99% population of Taiwan. The enrollees of this
program are predominantly employer-based but also
include disadvantaged individuals, such as people in the
low-income or disability sectors. This database thus
allows policy makers as well as researchers to trace the
changes of national drug expenditure and market struc-
ture after implementing these interventions in a closed
medical system.
Second, under the single-payer system of NHI, Taiwan
has established a national formulary (positive list), which
includes all drug products (~21,000 products) subject to
reimbursement by NHI. This detailed list of drug for-
mulary allows the researcher to provide information on
prescriptions of each NSAIDs product dispensed to
their beneficiaries and associated cost paid by the NHI
at the level of product.
Identifying policy interventions in this study
We provided quarterly data between January 2001 and
December 2004 on all our analyses. In our analyses, we
aimed to track two price regulations that could affect
the use and costs of NSAIDs: the price regulation imple-
mented in April 2001 (the second season (S2) of 2001;
2001S2) and March 2003 (2003S1). In, Taiwan, the NHI
imposes direct price controls on drugs by fixing the
reimbursement prices product by product. Every one or
two year, the NHI implements the price regulation to
re-set (usually decrease) the reimbursement price of
each product. The association between NHI’sr e i m b u r -
sement of two COX-2 inhibitors, the entries of these
new NSAIDs, in April 2001 (2001S2) and July 2001
(2001S3) and changes of drug expenditure were also of
concern. According to NHI’s Principles on Drug Reim-
bursement Price Approval [15], a new drug is defined as
a newly applied pharmaceutical product that owns a
new chemical entity, new dosage form, new admini-
strated route or new therapeutic effect compound to the
listed items in the pharmaceutical benefit scheme. New
drugs are further categorized as breakthrough, me-too,
and line extension based on drug innovation. Different
reimbursement price policies are applied in accordance
with how drugs are categorized based upon these defini-
tions. Both of the COX-2 inhibitors were defined as
breakthrough new drugs and were reimbursed by the
NHI at a relatively high price (celecoxib 100 mg, NT
16.7 and rofecoxib 25 mg, NT 33.4;, currency exchange
rate is approximately NT33 to US1) as compared to
non-selective NSIADs (mean price per tablet ~ NT
3.00) upon approval. Finally, the voluntary withdrawal of
rofecoxib worldwide on September 30, 2004 (2004S3)
due to an increased cardiovascular risk, two years after
it had been introduced into the market, was considered
as an information shock in our study.
Analyses
All NSAIDs prescribed in ambulatory visits in the NHI
system during our study period were included. In Tai-
wan, NSAIDs could be prescribed by physicians to
patients who needed it (approved indications from com-
mon pain to arthritis) and covered by the NHI program,
patients could then get NSAIDs without out-of-pocket
payment. As a result, the NHI database could capture
the use and cost of NSAIDs.
For each NSAIDs prescribed, the pharmacy record of
NHI databases included drug codes (a 10-digit coding
system that uniquely identifies product reimbursed by
the NHI), dosages, quantities, starting date (date
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Page 2 of 8prescription was dispensed) and prescription duration to
track all necessary information. For those who took any
of these medicines, the NHI databases also provided
information allowing one to track the indications of
their treatment.
Firstly, we calculated the aggregated mean quarterly
drug cost (reimbursement price multiply quantities
filled) and volume (converted into defined daily dose
(DDD)) according to the World Health Organization
definitions [16]) of all NSAIDs products. Drug cost and
volume of NSAIDs per ambulatory visit were then pro-
vided. We further specified drug cost and volume of
NSAIDs per rheumatoid arthritis (RA) or osteoarthritis
(OA) ambulatory visit since they are two main indica-
tions of NSAIDs.
Segmented regression analysis for interrupted time
series was used to determine the significance of the dif-
ferences in slopes over time due to four interventions:
(1) price regulation I (April, 2001), (2) new entry (July,
2001), (3) price regulation II (March, 2003), and infor-
mation shock (September, 2004). While the pre-inter-
vention segment serves as the control for the post-
intervention segment, segmented regression analysis for
interrupted time series data provides a credible metho-
dological approach to measure the effect attributable to
a specific event in time, i.e. the implementation of an
intervention [17]. Proper estimations of standard errors
and significance were made through the detection of
and correction for autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson
statistic was used to test for autocorrelation. Seasonal
effect of our data was also tested with the Dickey-Fuller
unit test. Significance was determined at the 0.05 level,
and SAS 9.1 (SAS, Cary, NC) was used for the statistical
analyses.
In order to describe market share of all NSAIDs pro-
ducts over time, we categorized these products based on
their reimbursement price. For those prices in 75%, 25-
75%, and 25% quartile of total products, we defined
them as high-priced, medium-priced, and low-priced
NSAIDs, respectively. The category was then used to
describe the change of market share of NSAIDs during
our study period. In addition, we separated two COX-2
inhibitors from high-priced NSAIDs to further clarify
their net effect as a new technology on change of mar-
ket share of NSAIDs. We then applied Herfindahl index
of concentration (the sum of the squared market shares
of all products) to further estimate the effect of policy
interventions on market structure of NSAIDs over time.
In general, Herfindahl indices between 0.10 and 0.18
define the market to be moderately concentrated and
indices above 0.18 to be concentrated. As the market
concentration increases, competition decrease and the
chances of monopoly increase.
Results
C o s to fN S A I D sp e rR Ao rO Aa m b u l a t o r yv i s i tv a r i e d
over the period of study. The mean quarterly cost
increased approximately 30% from NT 217.40 to NT
285.40 (currency exchange rate is approximately NT33
to US1) at the end of 2004. The cost dropped immedi-
ately by almost 20% after the price regulation was intro-
duced in April 2001 (2001S2), although the negative
change was not significant (p = 0.62). This decrease was
short-lived, however, after the adoption of two COX-2
inhibitors. The cost has significantly increased 40% after
adopting the COX-2 inhibitors (positive change, p =
0.02). The second price regulation did not stop the
trend (negative change, p = 0.26). However, the expendi-
ture declined when rofecoxib, one of the new entries,
was withdrawn from the market (negative change, p =
0.31) (Figure 1).
There was no significant change in the prescribing
volume of NSAIDs per RA or OA ambulatory visit, even
after the implementation of first price regulation (p =
0.63) and adoption of two COX-2 inhibitors (p = 0.82).
A 7% increase of NSAIDs volume, from 13.74 DDDs
(2003 S1) to 14.68 DDDs (2003 S2) was observed sooner
after the introduction of the second price regulation in
March 2003 (2003 S1) indicating a higher utilization in
response to the lower price reimbursed. However, this
change was short-lived because the long-term change
after the implementation of second price regulation was
not statistically significant (p = 0.05) (Figure 2).
The change of the NSAIDs market structure for RA/
OA treatment after new entries was of concern.
Although NSAIDs is a crowded therapeutic class,
choices of NSAIDs for RA/OA treatment had been
mostly from high-priced products (about 95% of
NSAIDs prescriptions consumed) across our observa-
tional period. This NSAIDs market, however, was chan-
ged after the introduction of two COX-2 inhibitors
(celecoxib and rofecoxib). The market share of these
products had been largely substituted by celecoxib and
rofecoxib up to 26.92% and 19.68%, respectively, in a
three-year period (from 2002 S2 to 2004 S3). Celecoxib,
the pioneer COX-2 inhibitor, appeared to have the first-
mover advantage in Taiwan’s NHI system (Figure 3).
The market share of celecoxib rapidly increased to
19.32% in only six months (2001 S4) after its listing into
the NHI’s benefit coverage and continued to increase
thereafter. Its competitor, the follower COX-2 inhibitor
(rofecoxib), however, did not follow the same diffusion
pattern as celecoxib. It took about two years to reach its
market share to 20.22% (2003 S4) after its listing and
sustained a 5% market share gap to celecoxib thereafter.
Overall, the combined effect of new entries had taken
about 50% (2004 S3) of the market originally taken by
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to rofecoxib’s withdrawal, yet, was a good opportunity
to celecoxib (market share of celecoxib from 26.92% to
36.30%) and other high-priced NSAIDs (market share
from 48.01% to 57.60%) because they immediately took
the market originally taken by rofecoxib (Figure 4).
Figure 5 displays the major market of NSAIDs for RA/
OA treatment (major market was defined as the market
that comprised NSAIDs products which account for the
top 80% of market share (cost)) and applies Herfindahl
index of concentration (HHI) to further estimate the
effect of interventions on market structure of NSAID
over time. To our surprise, only 25 products in 19 phar-
maceutical companies involved in the major market
we’re interested in (2001 S1). In other words, 80% of the
cost of NSAIDs for RA/OA treatment was consumed by
very limited NSAIDs products (25 in 660 (3.79%) pro-
ducts reimbursed by the NHI). Although the market
Figure 1 Expenditure of NSAIDs per RA/OA ambulatory visit, quarterly, 2001-2004. Quarterly expenditure of NSAIDs per RA or OA
ambulatory visit was plotted with the timing of each policy intervention marked. Quarterly expenditure of NSAIDs per ambulatory visit (for any
ambulatory visit with NSAID prescription) was also plotted separately as a reference group. The mean quarterly cost of NSAIDs per RA or OA
ambulatory visit increased approximately 30% at the end of 2004 following the reimbursement of two new drugs (COX-2 inhibitors).
Figure 2 Volume (DDDs) of NSAIDs per RA/OA ambulatory visit, quarterly, 2001-2004. Quarterly prescribing volume of NSAIDs per RA or
OA ambulatory visit was plotted with the timing of each policy intervention marked. Quarterly prescribing volume of NSAIDs per ambulatory
visit (for any ambulatory visit with NSAID prescription) was also plotted separately as a reference group.
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price regulation it has became more and more concen-
trated since the utilization of NSAIDs had been signifi-
cantly substituted by COX-2 inhibitors. At the end of
2002, less than two years after the adoption of COX-2
inhibitors, only 18 products in 13 pharmaceutical com-
panies remained in the major market. In the short run,
information due to rofecoxib’s withdrawal did not
change the major market of NSAIDs for RA/OA
treatment.
Figure 3 Market share of NSAIDs products, quarterly, 2001-2004. The market share (cost) of NASIDs products had been largely substituted
by celecoxib and rofecoxib up to 26.92% and 19.68%, respectively, in a three-year period.
Figure 4 Diffusion pattern of two COX-2 inhibitors (market share; cost (NT dollars)), quarterly, 2001-2004. The market share (cost) of
celecoxib in the NSAIDs market rapidly increased to 19.32% in only six months (2001 S4) after its listing into the NHI’s benefit coverage and
continued to increase thereafter. Its competitor, the follower COX-2 inhibitor (rofecoxib), however, took about two years to reach its market
share (cost) to 20.22% (2003 S4) after its listing and sustained a 5% market share gap to celecoxib thereafter.
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Pharmaceutical health policies are designed to regulate
cost, access and quality of patented drugs. Many of the
assumptions upon which policies are designed, however,
have not been empirically substantiated. This study was
conducted to provide a national longitudinal trend of
the NSAIDs pharmaceutical market in Taiwan during
the 4-year period with events in three kinds of interven-
tions (i.e., price regulation, new entries and information
shock). In the entire 4-year period drug cost per RA/OA
visit increased approximately 30% and we have found
that new entry could be the main driving force that
impacts the pharmaceutical market most in Taiwan
even under policies of price regulation. The fact that
market entry of COX-2 inhibitors was associated with
nearly a one-third increase in the cost per visit raises
concerns about the comparative value of new drugs,
especially in therapeutic area where some might ques-
tion whether the new drugs are truly distinguished from
older therapies.
This study captured the market changes from two
price regulations implemented by the Bureau of NHI.
However, the association between these regulations and
the market changes was very short-lived, especially
under the driving force of entries of new COX-2 inhibi-
tors. In Taiwan, price regulations were based on results
of an annually survey of market price and volume. The
“reference pricing” or “generic grouping” techniques
were also used to reduce the price variation among pro-
ducts with similarity of active ingredients. Using 1996-
2003 NHI’s claim data, Lee et al [18] has reported that
“reference pricing” or “generic grouping” used in the
price regulation schemes on April 2001 and March 2003
were the most effective price control strategies for redu-
cing total drug spending in Taiwan. However, in the
study of Lee et al [18], the impact of price regulation on
the total pharmaceutical spending appeared to be short-
lived as observed in our study.
This study, using NSAIDs as a case, has tried to reveal
a more detailed picture of changes in drug expenditure,
utilization, and market structure after price regulations.
Although the two price regulations used similar con-
cepts and techniques, their impacts are different. The
second price regulation implemented on March, 2003
(2003S1), however, did not significantly changes NSAIDs
expenditure. Instead, it was associated with a substantial
change of the NSAIDs volume prescribed for RA/OA
treatment. Market redistribution may have resulted from
providers’ replacing products under price regulation
with other more profitable products. Alternately, the
resulting prescription volume increases may have can-
celed the changes due to price regulation in a short
period.
Of great value, this study elucidates how new drugs
diffuse into the medical care system, how they begin to
substitute for existing products, and how they change
the cost of treatment. It is evident from our empirical
analysis that the first new entry, celecoxib, diffused
rapidly and took less than one year to reach to its pla-
teau of market share (23.68%, 2002 S2) after its being
Figure 5 Market structure of major market of NSAIDs for RA/OA treatment, quarterly, 2001-2004. Number of products and drug
companies that contributed to the top 80% NSAIDs market was plotted across time. Herfindahl index of concentration (HHI) was also provided
to further estimate the effect of policy interventions on market structure of NSAIDs over time.
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follower COX-2 inhibitor (rofecoxib), although having a
disadvantaged diffusion pattern as compared to cele-
coxib, continuously and steadily increased its market
share. Overall, the two new entries took up about 50%
(2004 S3) of the market originally held by traditional
NSAIDs. This sizable substitution of new drugs for tra-
ditional ones shows the potential of a generous health
care system in providing better access to new drugs for
their beneficiaries by encouraging the adoption and use
of expensive medical technology.
T h ec h a n g e so fd r u ge x p e n d i t u r ea f t e rt h em a r k e t
entry of COX-2 inhibitors was very large in Taiwan, the
c o s to fN S A I D sp e rR Ao rO Aa m b u l a t o r yv i s i t
increased by 40% following the approval of the new
drugs. The magnitude of this increase is very high when
compared to the overall trend in drug cost increase per
ambulatory visit in the NHI system during our study
period (drug cost per ambulatory visit NT 220 (yr 2001)
and NT 257 (yr 2004), increased by 16.8%) [19]. The
Bureau of Taiwan’s NHI has tried to manage the poten-
tial contribution of new drugs by using reference prices
through international comparisons, which require the
introductory prices be less than or equal to the median
of their list prices in 10 comparator countries (France,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Australia,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
However, because of the higher prices of new drugs in
the reference countries, which were all developed coun-
tries and all had higher per capita gross domestic pro-
duct (GDP) than that of Taiwan, the reimbursement
price of new drugs may be still very high [20]. In our
case, two COX-2 inhibitors, celecoxib 100 mg and rofe-
coxib 25 mg, were both categorized as breakthrough
new drugs and reimbursed at 5 to 10 times the price of
non-selective NSAIDs per tablet in Taiwan’s NHI sys-
tem. In addition, when prices are set by a regulating
agency, the price competition between patented drugs
apparently disappears due to the imbalanced market
mechanism [21-23]. Although rofecoxib should be con-
sidered as a follower in the COX-2 inhibitor category
after the introduction of celecoxib in Taiwan’s NHI sys-
tem, its introductory price was twice the introductory
price of celecoxib. However, our study found that the
high price of rofecoxib did not guarantee a good market
share as compared with celecoxib. Besides, the market
may become price-insensitive when third parties such as
insurance system greatly affect choices on behalf of an
individual [3,21-23]. The substitution of nonselective
NSAID with higher priced COX-2 inhibitors had thus
caused a significant economic impact on the cost of
treating chronic pain in patients with RA and OA in
whom long-term or life-long consumption of NSAIDs is
required. In this situation, the question must be asked
whether the increased cost of a new product paralleled
its improvement in clinical effectiveness.
The safety of new drugs is another on-going health
policy concern, especially when they start being rapidly
adopted once they are covered by a national insurance
program. There have been several new drugs withdrawn
from the market due to severe adverse drug reactions
not noticed in the pre-marketing stage. Our study drug,
rofecoxib, is one of the most significant examples. The
information shock due to rofecoxib’sw i t h d r a w a lw a s
followed by a 6% decline in the cost for RA/OA treat-
ments (NT 304.06 (2004 S3) vs. NT 285.24 (2004 S4)).
In the short run, there was only a slight change in drug
cost, however. This intervention is more clinically rele-
vant than other ones since the patients’ and physicians’
perception of the COX-2 inhibitors for RA/OA treat-
ments is expected to be altered. We believed further
studies on this issue would be of great benefit to policy
makers in managing drug safety signals.
Data and design limitations may affect the extent to
which the results of this study can be generalized.
Although we have specified three important policy inter-
ventions and applied segmented regression analysis for
interrupted time series to examine changes of drug
expenditure and volume after the implementation of
interventions, we could not control unobserved exogen-
ous factors. Therefore, our findings could only present
an association rather than a causality effect between
implementation of intervent i o n sa n dc h a n g e so fd r u g
expenditure or utilization. Due to data limitation, we
could only evaluate the short-term change after the
release of information of drug safety (three months after
the withdrawal of rofecoxib). Thus, our aggregated esti-
mate may reveal the change due to the withdrawal event
rather than the information on pharmaceutical market.
Data were lacking on which to base the differences
between reimbursement price and real market price of
NSAIDs drugs. As a result, our estimate may not reflect
the actual cost and dynamics of the pharmaceutical
market. Another limitation is that we assumed that the
traditional NSAID and COX-2 inhibitors (new genera-
tion of NSAIDs) had identical therapeutic markets,
while COX-2 inhibitors may not just be used to replace
traditional NSAIDs but they may also be used to
increase demand.
Conclusions
To our knowledge, our study may be the first study to
provide a detailed empirical picture of how policy inter-
ventions change the drug market. We have found that
any correlation between price regulation and a decrease
in drug expenditure appeared to be short-lived, espe-
cially under the influence of new entry. This study eluci-
dates how new drugs diffuse into the medical care
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ducts, and how they affect the cost of treatment. For
policy makers of health insurance program, a scheduled
surveillance for each new entry is therefore suggested to
provide a cost-effective treatment to their beneficiaries
and constrain escalating expenditure.
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